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ABSTRACT
This study analyses the effect of the attributes of ownership 
structure and corporate governance on financial ratios disclosure 
in Malaysian listed firms’ annual reports over two key periods, 
2001 and 2006. Overall, the extent of financial ratios disclosure 
has significantly increased from 12.2 per cent to 15.0 per cent. The 
highest level of financial ratios disclosure is for the sub-categories 
of Profitability, Cash Flow and Share Market Measures, whereas 
there is less information reported for Capital Structure and Liquidity 
ratios. Further, the analysis shows that the institutional ownership 
negatively influences the financial ratios disclosure for 2001; and 
foreign ownership is positively associated with financial ratios 
disclosure in 2006. Interestingly, family ownership appears to have 
no significant influence on the disclosure in either period. Ownership 
concentration, on the other hand has a positive association with 
financial ratios disclosure in 2001; this is the opposite direction than 
hypothesised. In addition, the corporate governance attributes have 
also influenced the financial ratios disclosure in 2001. As for control 
variables, firm size and profitability are found to have a positive 
relationship with financial ratios disclosure for both years. These 
findings provide evidence that the attributes of ownership structure 
and the implementation of sound corporate governance reduce the 
information asymmetry between management and stakeholders 
and therefore, further enhance transparency. 
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1. Introduction
Financial ratio is a widely used tool of financial analysis. The use 
of financial ratios to interpret financial statements provides a quick 
indication of a firm’s performance and financial position. This 
information could be useful in decision making, especially for non-
sophisticated users. Despite the benefits of utilising financial ratios, the 
disclosure of this analysis tool in the annual reports is not reasonably 
adequate. This might be due to the voluntary nature of disclosure of 
financial ratios (except for earnings per share). Voluntary disclosure is 
the discretionary release of financial and non-financial information 
in excess of mandatory requirements. Firms may voluntarily disclose 
certain items of information in their corporate annual reports. Prior 
studies in Malaysia focus on voluntary disclosure practices (Ghazali, 
2010; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Hossain, Tan, 
& Adams, 1994) but none of these studies examines the financial ratios 
disclosure. Accordingly, this study aims to examine the financial ratios 
disclosure behaviour of listed firms in Malaysia.
Ownership structure is a related aspect of corporate governance 
and arguably has its own influencing effect upon financial ratios 
disclosure. Jensen and Meckling (1976) postulate that ownership 
structure has the potential of reducing information asymmetries 
and thereby, alleviating agency conflict between shareholders and 
managers. Corporate ownership in Malaysia is characterised by a high 
concentration in equity shareholdings. Malaysia’s unique socio-cultural 
environment influences the nature and type of ownership structure. One 
of the distinctive types of Malaysian corporate ownership structure is the 
large holdings by family members (Claessens, Djenbow, & Lang, 2000). 
The World Bank (2005) notes about 67.2 per cent of Malaysian firms 
are managed by controlling family members. In addtion, foreign and 
institutional ownerships have considerable stakes in Malaysian listed 
firms (Abdul Samad, 2004). Though previous studies have examined 
the effect on ownership structure on voluntary disclosure in Malaysia, 
little research exists on the impact of ownership structure on financial 
ratios disclosure.
This study also examines the effect of the strength of corporate 
governance structure on financial ratios disclosure. The introduction 
of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) in 2000, and 
the Bursa Malaysia Revamped Listing Requirements (2001) highlight 
the importance of corporate governance and disclosure requirements. 
The corporate governance mechanisms are aimed at strengthening 
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the capital market, boosting investors’ confidence and improving the 
credibility and accountability of financial information produced by listed 
firms. As such, the focus of this study is to acquire an understanding 
of whether the strength of corporate governance can increase firms’ 
communication of financial ratios in annual reports. 
Accordingly, in light of the change in this environment, this study 
examines whether ownership structure and corporate governance 
structure are associated with financial ratios disclosure of listed firms 
in Malaysia. Ownership structure is characterised by concentrated 
ownership, family ownership, foreign ownership and institutional 
ownership. The strength of corporate governance structure is measured 
by the composite measure of 13 corporate governance attributes. 
Financial ratios disclosure is proxied by an aggregated disclosure 
score of 43 items of financial ratios. The sample consists of 80 firm-year 
observations over two key periods of 2001 and 2006. These two key 
periods are essential; the former captures the post Asian financial crisis 
and post introduction of the MCCG in 2000, whereas the latter is the 
period of post Enron collapse and pre global financial crisis. It is also 
before the revision of the MCCG in 2007. Data from the two periods 
were gathered from the annual reports of selected firms. 
The data on ownership structure and corporate governance 
attributes were regressed on the financial ratios disclosure scores after 
controlling for firm size, profitability and audit firm size. The results 
indicate an improvement in financial ratios disclosure between 2001 and 
2006. However, the level of disclosure is still relatively low. Further, 
the results reveal that different ownership structures have different 
impacts on disclosure practices. In addition, corporate governance 
attributes (such as number of directors and independent directors 
on the board) of the firms appear to have a positive influence on the 
level of financial ratios disclosure. Consistent with Aripin, Tower, and 
Taylor (2011), the results reveal that larger and profitable firms disclose 
more financial ratios information than the smaller and less profitable 
firms. Interestingly, the presence of a BigN auditor seems to have no 
significant influence on the extent of financial ratios disclosure in a firm’s 
the annual report. These results contradict the findings of Al Farooque, 
Zijl, Dunstan, and Karim (2008), Barako (2004), and Hossain, Tan, and 
Adams (1994). 
The findings of this study provide insights to policy makers and 
regulators regarding the need to consider ownership structure and 
corporate governance attributes in any regulatory process, in order to 
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improve transparency. It is believed that such focus will strengthen 
the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms and eventually 
improve the level of voluntary financial ratios disclosure in the annual 
reports, and hence will minimise the information asymmetry issues. 
Undeniably, financial ratios information is also available elsewhere, 
such as from financial analysts, however additional costs are normally 
incurred to obtain them. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
reviews prior literature related to the voluntary disclosure and develops 
the hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the research approach undertaken 
in this study. Section 4 presents the analysis and results. Finally, 
conclusions are drawn.
2. Literature Review 
This section discusses the benefits of financial ratios disclosure, reviews 
the past literature, and develops the hypotheses of this study.
2.1.	 The	Significance	of	Financial	Ratio	Analysis 
As noted by Subramanyam and Wild (2009), ratio analysis is among the 
most popular and widely used tools of financial analysis. The analysis 
is significant for several reasons, i.e. (1) providing evidence of the firm’s 
financial condition (Subramanyam & Wild, 2009); (2) a signalling tool 
(Mitchell, 2006); (3) assessing and comparing the firm’s performance 
(Watson, Shrives, & Marston, 2002); and (4) avoiding misleading 
influence of the absolute dollar figures (Altman, 1968; Beaver, 1966; 
Neophytou & Molinero, 2004).
The disclosure of financial ratios in the annual reports may be 
driven by several motives such as providing a quick and simple tool 
signalling the firms’ performance, communicating new information that 
is not comprehensively presented elsewhere, and reducing the time 
and cost of obtaining and processing information from other sources 
(Watson et al., 2002; Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005). Thus, it is 
believed that by disclosing this information in the annual reports, it 
can assist the users’ understanding of the firms’ financial performance. 
The Securities Commission (SC), which is the body that governs 
investors’ protection, rights and responsibility, suggests firms should 
disclose information that affects the decision making of investors in 
annual reports. The SC also recommends that intermediaries such as 
stockbroking firms, financial analysts and fund management companies 
Asian Journal of Business and Accounting 7(2), 2014 49
The Masters’ Control: How Ownership Structure Influences the Communication of  
Financial Ratios
use and analyse the accounting information, before producing their own 
reports (SIDC, 2014). However, the reports produced by these parties 
are sometimes confusing as compared to the original annual reports of 
the firms. Thus, important information such as financial ratios should 
be comprehensively reported by the firms in their annual reports.
2.2.	 Theoretical	Background	and	Hypotheses
This sub-section outlines the theoretical background covering Malaysian 
ownership structure, corporate governance and the control variables 
utilised in this study.
2.2.1 Malaysian Corporate Ownership Structures
Malaysia’s unique socio-cultural environment influences the types of 
corporate ownership structures. An insider-dominated mould with 
high level of ownership concentration, cross-holdings and significant 
participation of owners in management, typifies the Malaysian corporate 
sector. A number of surveys and studies report that on average, 55 per 
cent of shareholdings in listed firms in Malaysia are held by the top five 
(5) largest shareholders (World Bank, 2005; Abdul Samad, 2004; Mohd 
Sehat & Abdul Rahman, 2005). Moreover, evolving from traditional 
family owned enterprises, the ownership of many Malaysian listed firms 
is characterised as family ownership. Claessens et al. (2000) documented 
that on average, 58.7 per cent of listed firms in Malaysia are owned and 
managed by family members. The roles of the chief executive officer and 
chairman of the board are usually held by members of the controlling 
family. Further, World Bank (2005) reported that about 67.2 per cent of 
Malaysian listed firms are managed by the controlling family members. 
Within the corporate governance context, it is posited that 
ownership concentration and composition are two key aspects of 
ownership structure that influence the level of monitoring. When 
ownership is dispersed, firms are owned by outside shareholders but 
controlled by their managers. This fundamental conflict of interest 
between the management and its minority shareholders is referred 
to as a Type One agency problem (Jaggi, Leung, & Gul, 2009). The 
problem arises when small shareholders do not actively participate in 
corporate governance matters, partly due to the ‘free-rider’ mindset 
of an individual shareholder. On the other hand, when concentrated 
ownership exists, the majority of ownership is controlled by a small 
number of large, dominant shareholders who are likely to play an 
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important role in monitoring management. Thus, there is potentially 
a reduced agency problem in highly concentrated firms because of 
the greater alignment between owners and managers (Florackis, 2008; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, the large shareholders may have 
access to insider information and use the information to their own 
advantage, exploit access expenditure according to their own preference, 
and influence managers’ decisions (Claessens et al., 2000). There may 
be conflict of interests between insiders4 and minority shareholders, 
and this is referred to as a Type Two agency problem (Jaggi et al., 2009). 
Previous studies have reported various issues on voluntary 
disclosure (Barako, Hancock, & Izan, 2006; Botosan & Harris, 2000; 
Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Guthrie, Petty, & Ricceri, 2006; Ho, Tower, & 
Barako, 2008). Studies on the incentive of this particular financial ratios 
disclosure incentive are, however, limited (Aripin, Tower, & Taylor, 
2008; Mitchell, 2006; Watson et al., 2002; Courtis, 1996).
In Malaysia, Abdullah (2006) investigated the association between 
board structure and ownership structure on financially distressed firms. 
Due to a highly concentrated ownership structure of Malaysian firms, 
the study hypothesises that management shareholding is negatively 
associated with financial distress. The results support the hypothesis. 
From a different perspective, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) who also studied 
the disclosure practices of Malaysian listed firms found a positive 
association between diffused ownership and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. Later, Ghazali (2010) examined the association between 
corporate governance and voluntary disclosure of Malaysian listed firms 
using the annual reports of 2001 and 2006. The results are consistent 
with the introduction of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
(MCCG)5 in year 2000, where the disclosure increased between these two 
periods. However, there is no significant association between corporate 
governance mechanisms and voluntary disclosure. Further, Mohamad 
and Sulong (2010) investigated the influence of corporate governance 
mechanisms and the extent of corporate governance disclosure by 
Malaysian firms in their annual reports. In that study, the authors 
4 These insiders may be members of the firms’ founding families or managers or the 
government or a small group of shareholders (Solomon & Solomon, 2004). For example, the 
government plays an important role in France and China; South Korea with its Chaebol family 
groups representing the interests of dominant shareholders; and Germany with banks playing 
a key role in funding a company. This influence permits the insiders to exercise control via the 
board structure; while founding families are often the dominant shareholders in Malaysia. 
5 MCCG prescribes principles and best practices for good governance, makes recommendations 
to strengthen the overall regulatory framework for public listed firms and introduces self-
regulatory mechanisms for good corporate governance (High Level Finance Committee on 
Corporate Governance, 2000)
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conclude that a higher percentage of family members on the board is 
associated with a lower level of corporate governance disclosure. 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Ghazali (2010) focus on the overall 
voluntary disclosures of Malaysian firms. To-date, there is no research 
done to investigate the specific financial ratios disclosure in the Malaysian 
annual reports and its link with ownership structure and corporate 
governance. Given the increase in corporate governance reforms in 
Malaysia, this study advances the unique research proposition that the 
extent of financial ratios disclosure by Malaysian listed firms for 2006 is 
greater than 2001. Both periods are before the financial crisis 2007-2008. 
Essentially, year 2001 is selected to capture the insights of the post Asian 
financial crisis, where MCCG was newly introduced in 2000, while year 
2006 is the post Enron collapse and before the revision of the MCCG 
in 2007. These two periods are milestones in the corporate governance 
landscape in Malaysia.
2.2.2 Hypotheses
Ownership structure is a related aspect of corporate governance and 
arguably has its own influencing effect upon voluntary disclosure. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) postulate that ownership structure has the 
potential of reducing information asymmetries and thereby, alleviating 
agency conflict between shareholders and managers. High dispersion 
of ownership (low ownership concentration) occurs when the majority 
of shareholding is held by a large number of individual shareholders. 
Agency theory argues that firms will disclose more information to 
reduce agency costs and information asymmetry in a diffused ownership 
environment (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, discretionary disclosure 
in annual reports is likely to be greater in widely held firms so that 
individual shareholders can effectively monitor to ensure their economic 
interests are optimised and managers can signal that they act in the 
best interests of the owners. Greater disclosure in firms with diffused 
ownership is empirically documented in Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and 
Chau and Gray (2002).
Ownership concentration 
When ownership is concentrated, the dominant shareholders play 
a monitoring role and are expected to put more pressure on the 
management to disclose additional information. On the other hand, if 
ownership concentration is largely in the hands of insiders, entrenched 
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management can themselves engage in expropriation. On the other 
hand, if ownership concentration is largely in the hands of insiders, 
entrenched management can themselves engage in expropriation. A 
fundamental problem is how to protect minority outside shareholders 
from the controlling insider shareholders who may act in their own 
interests at the expense of the former. In the absence of large outside 
share ownership, a firm with a higher insider ownership concentration 
may be associated with a lower extent of voluntary disclosure, as 
evidenced in Hossain et al. (1994)’s study among Malaysian listed 
firms. On the contrary, Birt, Bilson, Smith, and Whaley (2006) reported 
that Australian firms having high levels of shares owned by top 20 
shareholders are more likely to disclose voluntary segment information. 
The rationale for such findings is that the ownership concentration when 
in the hands of large shareholders has the ability to mitigate agency 
problems inherent in a firm, by influencing voluntary disclosures 
made by that firm. Inconsistent with the above studies, Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006) found no significant association between ownership 
concentration (measured using top ten shareholders) and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure of Malaysian listed firms. 
In relation to voluntary disclosure of financial ratios, Aripin et 
al. (2008) and Mitchell (2006) used Australian firms to examine its 
association with ownership concentration. Their results suggest that the 
more concentrated the ownership structure, the less the financial ratios 
information is disclosed to the shareholders. Mitchell (2006) posits that 
firms with concentrated ownership are more likely to have less agency 
cost, thus provide less information. 
The aforementioned literature on the influence of the degree of 
ownership structure on the extent of voluntary disclosure indicates 
inconclusive findings. This could be the result of the variations in firms’ 
ownership structure. Similarly, prior studies of Malaysian firms also 
produced inconsistent results with regard to ownership concentration 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Hossain et al., 
1994). These mixed findings across various studies clearly demonstrate 
the importance of considering the effect of ownership structure as a 
governance mechanism in influencing a firm’s corporate disclosure 
practices.
Given the high insider ownership concentration that characterises 
the Malaysian firms and the proposition advanced in the agency theory, 
it is hypothesised as follows:
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H1: The extent of financial ratios disclosure is negatively associated 
with concentrated ownership structure.
Family ownership
One of the distinct types of Malaysian corporate ownership structure 
is large shareholdings by family members (Claessens et al., 2000). The 
World Bank (2005) reported that about 67.2 per cent of Malaysian firms 
are managed by family members. Due to the dominant position of 
family members in family-owned firms, the firms have little motivation 
to disclose information in excess of mandatory requirements. It can be 
argued that the insider shareholders of these firms can readily obtain 
the information and thus, the demand for external reported corporate 
information is small (Chau & Gray, 2002; Ho & Wong, 2001). Therefore, 
the following hypothesis is proposed:
H2: There is a negative association between family ownership and 
financial ratios disclosure.
Foreign ownership
Agency theory posits that as the number of outsider shareholders 
increases and ownership becomes more dispersed, monitoring costs 
becomes greater, and hence, demands for additional information 
increase. Prior studies documented that when a high proportion of 
shares is held by foreigners, the demand for disclosure is greater. It is 
argued that there is a greater need for disclosure as a means to monitor 
the action of management, by foreign owners (Barako et al., 2006). After 
the liberalisation of capital flows in the early 1990s, foreign funds started 
to increase to enhance the local bourse liquidity (Suto, 2003). In fact, 
Tun Mahathir Mohamed, the then Prime Minister and Finance Minister, 
stated in the Parliament when tabling the Budget 2003 that “Malaysian 
economic growth has been overly reliant on external sector development, 
foreign direct investment and international trade” (Mohamed, 2002, 
p17). The influx of foreign investment leads to the significant growth 
of the Malaysian stock market (Economy Report, 2000). In this regard, 
higher disclosure may be expected because substantial funds in the 
Malaysian capital market come from foreign investors who demand 
greater information. It is thus hypothesised as follows:
H3: Firms with higher foreign ownership are associated with higher 
extent of financial ratios disclosure. 
Norhani Aripin, Pauline Ho and Greg Tower
Asian Journal of Business and Accounting 7(2), 201454
Institutional ownership
Substantial shareholdings by institutional investors provide strong 
incentives to monitor and encourage corporate disclosure practices. 
As shareholdings of institutional investors increase, the institutional 
investors will have higher incentives to play an active role in the 
corporate governance of the firms to protect their stakes and reputation. 
Managers may voluntarily disclose more information to meet the 
expectations of this arguably more expert group of shareholders. 
Consequently, it is hypothesised as follows:
H4: There is a positive association between institutional ownership and 
the extent of financial ratios disclosure by Malaysian listed firms. 
Corporate governance
The implementation of effective corporate governance mechanisms 
offers a solution to monitor and reduce managers’ opportunistic 
behaviour. According to the agency theory tenets, corporate governance 
structure is needed to monitor and control the actions of executive 
directors (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and to ensure that managers 
are working in the best interest of the shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). The adoption of corporate governance structure is an important 
determinant in influencing management to make greater disclosure of 
information voluntarily . For this study, 13 selected attributes are used 
to capture the corporate governance element. These 13 most studied 
items are independent chairman, duality, independent board, directors 
appointment, board code of conduct, share-based remuneration, 
directors’ remuneration, financial expertise on audit committee, risk 
management policy, CEO statement on internal control, audit committee 
charter, continuous disclosure policy and independent audit committee 
(Taylor, 2008; Aripin et al., 2008). An effective corporate governance 
structure serves as a linchpin in the system of monitoring to effectively 
align the behaviour of managers and the board of directors with the 
desires of shareholders through greater voluntary disclosure (Ho et al., 
2008). It is reasonable to expect that a stronger governance structure will 
be associated with a greater extent of voluntary disclosures. Thus, it is 
hypothesised as follows:
H5: The extent of financial ratios disclosure for Malaysian listed firms 
is positively associated with stronger firms’ corporate governance 
structure.
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2.2.3 Control Variables
In order to test the above hypotheses, this study includes firm 
characteristics identified in prior research as determinants of firms’ 
voluntary disclosure as control variables. The variables are firm size 
(Taylor, 2008; Morton & Harrison, 2009; Barako, 2004; Watson et al., 
2002), profitability (Oliveira, Rodrigues, & Craiz, 2006), and audit firm 
size (Al Farooque et al., 2008; Barako et al., 2006; Oliveira et al., 2006). 
These firm-specific non-governance variables are included based on 
their relevancy to this study as suggested by previous researchers.
3. Research Approach
3.1.	 Sample	Selection	and	Data	Collection
This study focuses on firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia Stock Exchange 
in years 2001 and 2006. These two periods are considered critical in 
terms of regulatory reforms following environmental changes where 
2001 represents post-1997 financial crisis and 2006 post-Enron debacle. 
Year 2001 is considered as disclosure-based regime, where the corporate 
governance framework was introduced in Malaysia, with a new 
reporting framework. For year 2006, this is the era after the Enron-
Anderson debacle where higher corporate transparency is expected. 
This approach is consistent with Ghazali (2010) who analysed 2001 and 
2006 annual reports, and Mohamed and Sulong (2010) who focused on 
the 2002 and 2006 periods. Forty (40) sample firms from both periods 
were selected based on the following criteria: (i) availability of annual 
reports of firms for both periods;  (ii) listing availability in both periods 
under study; (iii) banks, unit trust, insurance and finance companies 
were excluded from the study due to different and stringent regulatory 
requirements; and (iv) newly listed firms in the first period (2001) were 
excluded, with the assumption disclosure practices can be assessed 
realistically if they had been in the stock exchange for more than a 
year (Ho, 2009). The firms were equally (eight firms) selected from 
five industrial sectors namely consumer product, industrial product, 
construction and property, trading and services, and plantation sectors. 
The minimum number of 30 firms as suggested by Sekaran (2003) is 
met. This approach is consistent with a number of previous accounting 
disclosure studies such as Mohamad and Sulong (2010). In that study, 
they selected 40 firms representing four main industries for both 2002 
and 2006 periods. 
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3.2.	 Dependent	Variable:	Extent	of	Financial	Ratios	Disclosure	
(EFRD)
The Extent of Financial Ratios Disclosure (EFRD) index is the proxy to 
measure the extent of financial ratios disclosure. EFRD for a firm for 
a particular year was computed based on a checklist comprising 43 
financial ratios commonly noted by seminal authors (Subramanyam 
& Wild, 2009; Horngren, Harrison, Bamber, Best, Frase, & Willet, 2006; 
Hoggett, Edwards, & Medlin, 2006; Mitchell, 2006; Stickney, Brown, & 
Wahlen, 2004; Watson et al., 2002; Peirson & Ramsay, 2000; Maxwell, 
Onus, & Fox, 1998; Hoskin, 1994). These ratios were classified into five 
major categories: Profitability [nine items]; Cash Flow [nine items]; Share 
Market Measures [11 items], Capital Structure [seven items]; and Liquidity 
[seven items]. The details of the financial ratios are shown in Appendix 
1. Each voluntary financial ratio was noted as one (1) if disclosed in the 
annual report for each firm and zero (0) if otherwise. The EFRD score 
was then computed by summing up all items disclosed divided by the 
maximum possible score. 
3.3.	 Independent	and	Control	Variables
The data for all independent and control variables were extracted 
from the sample firms’ annual reports. Table 1 summarises the 






Proportion of shares held by top five 
shareholders 
FAM Family ownership Proportion of shares held by family members 
INST Institutional 
ownership 








CGS being the composite measure of 13 
corporate governance attributes. A firm receives 
a CGS score ranging from 0 to 13 depending on 
the number of conditions satisfied.
FSIZE Firm size Natural log of total assets
ROA Profitability Ratio of net profit before tax to total assets
AUDIT Size of audit firm 1 if the firm is audited by Big N firm and 0 if 
otherwise
Table 1: Definition and Measurement of Explanatory Variables 
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Table 2 displays the descriptive results for mean EFRD over the 
observed periods. The EFRD increases from a mean of 12.20 per cent 
in 2001 to 14.99 per cent in 2006, representing a rise by 22.86 per cent. 
Notwithstanding the increase, the overall EFRD is still relatively low. 
These data show great diversity of disclosures of EFRD which range 
from 0 to 20.93 per cent in 2001 and from 0 to 30.23 per cent in 2006. The 
EFRD is approximately normally distributed as indicated in Table 2.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variable
EFRD Mean Median Min. Max. Std. 
Dev
Skewness Kurtosis
2001 12.20 12.79 0.00 20.93 4.55 -0.28 0.23
2006 14.99 13.95 0.00 30.23 6.29 0.73 0.20
Table 3 tabulates the sub-categories of financial ratios, which are 
disclosed by the sample firms. The results reveal that Profitability ratios 
have the highest percentage of disclosure with 19.16 per cent (2001) 
and 24.44 per cent (2006). These Profitability ratios include pre-tax profit 
margin, sales turnover, return on equity, net profit margin and gross 
profit margin. The second highest group of ratios communicated in 2006 
are the Share Market ratios (18.40 per cent). Such findings are consistent 
with Watson et al. (2002) and Mitchell (2006). Sample firms tend to 
disclose few financial ratios related to Liquidity and Capital Structure 
over the two periods. Further, descriptive statistics as provided in Table 
3 indicate that the mean Ownership Concentration (OCON), Family 
Ownership (FAM) and Institutional Ownership (INST) for all sample 
firms in 2001 is 57.53, 26.25 and 18.94 per cent, respectively. The mean 
of these ownership structure for all sample firms in 2006 is relatively 
consistent with a mean of 58.47, 27.14 and 17.25 per cent, respectively. 
The average foreign ownership shows an increase from 17.77 per cent in 
2001 to 22.69 per cent in 2006. Sample firms generally exhibit a stronger 
corporate governance structure, based on the Corporate Governance 
Score (CGS), with an increase in mean of 46.35 per cent in 2001 to 67.50 
per cent in 2006. 
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Paired t-tests are performed to examine the statistical significance 
of differences between the means of the financial ratios disclosure scores 
over the study periods, as shown in Table 4. These are performed by 
comparing 2001 and 2006, showing the percentage change in mean 
between the two years. The correlations between paired samples are 
significant at the 1 per cent level. For each category of financial ratio, 
the hypothesised mean difference = 0; df = 39; and t critical one-tailed = 
1.684. The one-tailed significance is reported because of the directional 
nature of the overarching research proposition. 
Variables Mean Median Min. Max. Std. Dev.
2001
PROF 19.16 22.22 0.00 44.44 13.31
CF 16.94 22.22 0.00 22.22 7.11
SMM 16.58 18.18 0.00 27.27 5.40
CS 1.42 0.00 0.00 28.57 5.41
LIQ 1.07 0.00 0.00 14.29 3.81
OCON 57.53 58.33 0.18 0.91 18.70
FAM 26.25 26.85 0.00 0.70 25.94
INST 18.94 18.75 35.39 94.62 21.96
FOR 17.77 6.45 0.00 67.20 22.64
CGS 46.35 46.15 7.69 76.92 18.89
2006
PROF 24.44 22.22 0.00 77.78 17.46
CF 16.66 22.22 0.00 22.22 7.11
SMM 18.40 18.18 9.09 45.45 7.56
CS 2.50 0.00 0.00 42.86 8.49
LIQ 7.61 0.00 0.00 33.33 11.90
OCON 58.47 58.12 25.78 83.74 15.14
FAM 27.14 24.79 0.00 75.46 27.15
INST 17.25 17.01 0.00 89.85 25.27
FOR 22.69 12.54 0.00 76.57 24.11
CGS 67.50 69.23 38.46 92.31 15.13
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Notes: Table 3 displays descriptive statistics of continuous independent variables. EFRD = overall 
extent of financial ratios disclosure score; PROF = profitability; CF = cash flow; SMM = share market 
measures; CS = capital structure; and LIQ = liquidity. The independent variables include OCON 
= top 5 shareholdings; FAM = family ownership; INST = institutional ownership; FOR = foreign 
ownership; and CGS = corporate governance structure. 
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The analysis shows that there is a statistically significant increase 
in the mean EFRD (1 per cent level), for Profitability (5 per cent level), 
Share Market Measures (10 per cent level) and Liquidity (1 per cent level) 
for sample firms between 2001 and 2006. The increases in Cash Flow 
and Capital Structure ratios are not statistically significant between the 
two periods. The overarching research proposition that overall EFRD 
for 2006 is greater than 2001 is thus supported, and a similar pattern 
is found for the Profitability, Share Market Measures and Liquidity sub-
categories ratios. Overall, the results suggest that Malaysian firms are 
disclosing more financial ratios information over time. 
Table 5 provides the Pearson Product-moment correlation 
coefficients for the continuous explanatory variables in each period. 
Corporate Governance Score (CGS) is positively and significantly 
correlated with Ownership Concentration (OCON) (p < 0.01), 
Institutional Ownership (INST) (p < 0.05) and Foreign Ownership (FOR) 
(p < 0.05) in 2001. The significant correlations continue to exist between 
Corporate Governance Score (CGS), and Institutional Ownership 
(INST) and Foreign Ownership (FOR) in 2006. Significant negative (p 
< 0.05) correlations are found between Corporate Governance Score 
(CGS) and Family Ownership (FAM) for both periods. The maximum 
correlation coefficients are reported between Family Ownership 
(FAM) and Institutional Ownership (INST) of 0.472 and 0.506 in 2001 
Table 4: Paired T-Test of Financial Ratios Disclosure Scores Between 2001 
and 2006
Notes: Table 4 shows the paired sample t-test results for mean financial ratios disclosure scores of 
the overall score (EFRD) and the five key sub-categories namely, (i) PROF = profitability; (ii) CF = 
cash flow; (iii) SMM = share market measures; (iv) CS = capital structure; and (v) LIQ = liquidity. 
*, ** and *** are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
EFRD PROF CF SMM CS LIQ
Mean of paired differences (%) 2.790 5.28 0.28 1.82 -1.07 -6.55
% change 22.68 27.49 -1.59 10.97 74.82 621.49
Correlation 0.710* 0.602* 0.532* 0.528* 0.717* 0.315*
Hypothesised mean difference 0 0 0 0 0 0
Df 39 39 39 39 39 39
t-Stat -3.981 -2.346 0.255 -1.749 -1.138 -3.667
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.000* 0.012** 0.400 0.044*** 0.131 0.000*
t Critical one-tail 1.684 1.684 1.684 1.684 1.684 1.684
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and 2006 respectively. None of the correlation coefficients between 
explanatory variables exceed 0.8 (Judge, Griffith, Hill, & Lee, 1980). 
Thus, multicollinearity is considered non-problematic in this study. 
In addition, the non-presence of multicollinearity has been confirmed 
using variance inflation factor (VIF). 
2001 CGS OCON FAM INST FOR FSIZE PROF
CGS 1
OCON 0.421* 1
FAM -0.364** -0.215 1
INST 0.310** 0.455* -0.472* 1
FOR 0.302** 0.360** -0.334** -0.135 1
FSIZE -0.104 -0.032 0.003 0.312** -0.182 1
PROF 0.103 0.170 -0.231 0.159 0.263 0.179 1
2006 CGS OCON FAM INST FOR FSIZE PROF
CGS 1
OCON 0.160 1
FAM -0.361** -0.093 1
INST 0.322** 0.373* -0.506* 1
FOR 0.280** 0.109 -0.323** -0.073 1
FSIZE -0.052 -0.033 0.093 0.283** -0.063 1
PROF 0.215 0.151 0.133 0.149 0.155 0.435* 1
Table 5: Pearson Correlation Matrix for the Continuous Explanatory 
Variables
Notes: Pearson correlation matrix shows the correlation coefficients for all the continuous 
explanatory variables. CGS = corporate governance structure, OCON = ownership concentration, 
FAM = family ownership, INST = institutional ownership, FOR = foreign ownership, FSIZE = firm 
size, and PROF = profitability. All the correlation coefficients are below 0.8; hence, multicollinearity is 
not a concern in this study.* and ** = correlations are significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.
4.2.	 Regression	Analysis
The multiple regression results of the overall EFRD of each period are 
summarised in Table 6. The model has the values of adjusted R-squared 
of 44.2 per cent in 2001 and 26.5 per cent in 2006. The overall regression 
model in each period are significant (p < 0.01 and p < 0.1 respectively), 
thus, explaining a substantial percentage of the variation in the overall 
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EFRD. Table 6 reports the maximum VIF of 3.164 which is kept well 
below ten, indicating no multicollinearity problems (Belsely, 1991). 
Hence, the results of the regression analysis can be interpreted with a 
greater degree of confidence.
Interestingly, ownership structure has a different impact on the 
disclosure of financial ratios over the two periods. As revealed in 
Table 6, the ownership concentration is positively and significantly 
associated (p < 0.1) with the extent of financial ratios disclosure in 
2001. The findings do not support H1 of this study but are consistent 
with Ho, Tower, and Taylor (2013) for Malaysian firms and Birt et al. 
(2006) for Australian firms’ voluntary disclosure practices. However, 
this significant association is not found in the latter years. 
Family ownership shows no statistically significant association 
with firms’ financial ratios disclosure in 2001 and 2006, thus, H2 is 
not supported. The proportion of shares held by foreign shareholders 
indicates a significant (p < 0.1) positive association with financial ratios 
disclosure in 2006. H3 is only supported in that year but not in 2001. 
Institutional ownership is significantly negatively associated (p < 0.01) 
with financial ratios disclosure in 2001, contrary to what is hypothesised 
in H4. This implies that institutional shareholders do not play an active 
role in monitoring management to provide greater financial ratios 
disclosure. 
The strength of the corporate governance structure determines 
the EFRD. Table 6 reveals that firms’ governance structure is positively 
and significantly associated (p < 0.01) with the overall EFRD in 2001, 
consistent to H5. However, no such significant association is found 
in 2006. 
Profitability as measured by return on assets has recently been 
raised and included as a control factor (Morris & Tronnes, 2008). It is 
considered as an important corporate attribute associated with voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports (Alsaeed, 2005; Kent & Ung, 2003). 
The results reported in Table 6 show that return on assets is positively 
and significantly associated with the overall EFRD in both periods in a 
consistent manner. A similar trend is also found corresponding to firm 
size. For both years, larger firms appear to provide more financial ratios 
in their annual reports, as compared to the smaller firms. In terms of 
audit firm size, the results show lack of statistical significance in both 
periods, suggesting that the size of audit firm has no bearing on the 
overall EFRD.
Norhani Aripin, Pauline Ho and Greg Tower
Asian Journal of Business and Accounting 7(2), 201462
5. Discussions and Conclusion
This study examines the effect of ownership structure on the financial 
ratios disclosure practices in Malaysian firms. It extends previous 
financial ratios disclosure studies in two ways. First, it focuses on the 
two key time periods, i.e. 2001 and 2006 during which remarkable 
corporate governance reforms have taken place. Second, it examines the 
impact of ownership structure and corporate governance structure on 
the EFRD. This research is similar with Ghazali (2010) in term of period 
of study, however the focus is different, whereby the current research 
concentrates on voluntary financial ratios disclosure.
The findings suggest a rise in the EFRD between 2001 and 2006 
ranging from 12.2 per cent to about 15 per cent. However, the overall 
EFRD is still relatively low. There are several possible reasons that may 
contribute to the low level of EFRD. A possible reason is the sceptical 
  2001 2006
Adjusted R² 0.442 0.265
Durbin-Watson 2.198 1.843
F statistic 5.411* 2.757***
Predicted 
sign
Coefficients t Stat VIF Coefficients t Stat VIF
Intercept -0.422 -3.813* -0.117 -0.654
OCON - 0.071 1.688*** 1.928 0.017 0.273 1.323
FAM - -0.024 -0.768 2.387 -0.023 -0.499 2.067
INST + -0.114 -2.574* 3.164 -0.006 -0.108 2.384
FOR + -0.039 -1.143 2.201 0.075 1.733*** 1.458
CGS + 0.122 3.544* 1.558 -0.001 -1.253 1.407
FSIZE + 0.021 4.361* 1.408 0.015 2.060** 1.646
ROA + 0.322 3.185* 1.448 0.089 1.748*** 1.753
AUDIT + 0.004 0.247 1.343 -0.020 -0.816 1.348
Table 6: Multiple Regression Analysis of Determinants of Extent of 
Financial Ratios Disclosure 
Notes: Table 6 shows the results of regression of the overall extent of financial ratios disclosure 
(EFRD) in 2001 and 2006 against the independent variables and control variables. The EFRD 
for a firm for a particular year is computed based on a checklist of 43 financial ratios. OCON = 
ownership concentration; FAM = family ownership; INST = institutional ownership; FOR = foreign 
ownership; CGS = corporate governance structure; FSIZE = firm size; ROA = return on assets; and 
AUDIT = audit firm size. One-tailed probabilities are used for the tests except the AUDIT variable. 
Associations *, ** and *** are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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perception of the management on the importance of the financial ratios 
disclosure in decision making. Similar assertion is forwarded by Mitchell 
(2006) who contends that many ratios are possibly important to only 
certain groups of users. Another possible reason is financial ratios can 
be calculated by anybody with some basic business knowledge, or 
they can be provided by professional financial analysts. However, it is 
important to note that the non-disclosure of financial ratio information 
can result in users having to spend time and incur cost, to obtain the 
information elsewhere (Watson et al., 2002). 
The variables of ownership structure exhibit a pattern of selective 
impacts. The findings suggest that shareholders influence the EFRD 
in disparate ways. Concentrated ownership in Malaysian firms tends 
to play a positive role in monitoring management to provide financial 
ratios disclosure voluntarily. This is consistent with Ho (2009). However, 
the results contradict with the findings of several Malaysian studies 
such as Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Hossain et al. (1994). The 
inconsistent results may be due to different measurement (percentage of 
shareholding of top 10 shareholders) being used in the various studies.
As evidenced from the findings, foreign ownership has greater 
monitoring influence on the management to provide greater financial 
ratios information in 2006. One possible explanation is that foreign 
owners are more likely to be actively involved in international share 
markets. Such exposure may motivate them to seek important and 
relevant information such as financial ratios in making informed 
decisions. Listed firms seeking foreign participation may voluntarily 
disclose this information.
The findings that there is a positive association between corporate 
governance structure and financial ratios disclosure, indicate a 
complementary monitoring role of the MCCG in financial ratios 
disclosure. However, such evidence is only present in 2001 but not 
in 2006. The findings further suggest that the corporate governance 
structure is not an important predictor in determining the provision of 
financial ratios in the 2006 annual reports. On the same note, Coulton, 
James, and Taylor (2001) conclude that corporate governance is neither 
ineffective nor influential on compensation disclosure. Similarly, 
Linden and Matolcsy (2004) argue that a best single practice may not 
be relevant for all firms. Further, the decision to disclose the financial 
ratios in the annual report may be discussed at a more internalised level 
of management such as the firm’s accountant and secretary, instead of 
among the board of directors or audit committee.
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The findings of the study have implications for disclosure policies 
and governance initiatives in relation to ownership structure and 
composition, especially in Malaysia where the environment is prone 
to secrecy rather than transparency. Over time, notwithstanding the 
governance initiatives, the heavily regulated Malaysian capital market 
(Gomez & Jomo, 1997) may not present ideal conditions for encouraging 
transparent disclosure. Financial report preparers, especially for smaller 
and less profitable firms with concentrated ownership and owned 
by family members must fully utilise the financial ratios disclosure 
properties. They will be at a disadvantage if they are not able to 
better explain the unfavourable performance to their stakeholders, as 
compared to their counterparts.
This study has some limitations. First, the main focus of this 
study is merely on the extent of financial ratios disclosure, and may 
not encompass or necessarily reflect the true state of affairs of firms. 
Second, this study does not attempt to evaluate the usefulness of 
financial ratios disclosed in the annual reports to the users. Due to 
its simplicity and speediness, it is assumed that this information may 
assist users in making informed decision making. It is suggested that 
future research incorporates the recent Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance launched in 2012, which takes into account current changes 
and recommendations in line with global and local corporate governance 
reforms, to assess the impact of financial ratios disclosure. 
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APPENDIX 1: Extent of Financial Ratios Disclosure (EFRD) – List of Ratios
Five Key Sub-categories Specific ratio
1. Profitability 1.Pre-tax profit margin
2.Sales turnover





8.Return on assets (ROA)
9.Return on sales
2.. Cash Flow 1.Dividend payment






8.Cash flow to revenue
9.Cash flow return on assets
3. Share Market Measure 1.Price-to-earnings (P/E) 
2.Net tangible assets per share (NTAB)
3.Net assets per share (NAB)
4.Dividend yield
5.Market capitalisation
6.Total shareholder return (TSR)
7. Dividend payout 
8.Earnings yield
9.Price-to-book
10.Book value per ordinary share
11.Market-to-book ratio







5. Liquidity 1.Current ratio
2.Inventory turnover
3.Quick ratio
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